




























Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Pink, T. (2014). Law and the Normativity of Obligation: Jurisprudence Annual Lecture 2014. Jurisprudence, 5(1),
1-28. https://doi.org/10.5235/20403313.5.1.1
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.














The paper examines the natural law tradition in ethics and legal theory. This tradition is 
shown to address two questions.  
 
The first question is to do with the nature of law, and the kind of human capacity that is 
subject to legal direction. Is law directive of the voluntary – of what is subject to the will, 
or what can be done or refrained from on the basis of a decision so to do? Or is law 
directive of some other kind of capacity? The second question is about the nature of 
ethical normativity, and the relation within normativity of its directive and appraisive 
aspects. Is direction primary, and appraisal to be explained in terms of a theory of 
direction; or must a theory of ethical direction be based on a theory of ethical appraisal? 
Both issues are introduced by reference to Hume’s ethical theory, which raises them in a 
particularly sharp form. 
 
The natural law tradition, in the form it reached by the early modern period, is shown to 
combine giving a primacy to the appraisive in normative theory, with, in legal theory, a 
detachment of law from any exclusive tie to the direction of the voluntary. At the heart of 
the theory of natural law is the idea of law as a distinctive form of normativity directive of 
a capacity not for voluntariness, but for self-determination. Combined with a view of the 
state not just as a coordinative authority but as a coercive teacher, this led to a distinctive 
and highly controversial view of the scope of positive law. The paper ends with Hobbes’s 
sharp opposition to this view of positive law – an opposition that focussed, in particular, 








































1. The problem of obligation 
 
In the appendix iv ‘Of some verbal disputes’ to An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals David Hume criticized what he took to be a serious distortion 
in moral theory: 
  
Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise, treating all morals as on a like 
footing with civil laws, guarded by sanctions of reward and punishment, were 
necessarily led to render this circumstance, of voluntary or involuntary, the 
foundation of their whole theory…but this, in mean time, must be allowed, that 
sentiments are every day experienced of blame and praise, which have objects 
beyond the dominion of the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as 
moralists, as speculative philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory theory and 
explication.  David Hume An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. 
P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975), appendix iv, 'Of some verbal 
disputes' p. 322 
 
Hume claimed to be uncovering an unwarranted intrusion into moral theory of 
notions from positive law. The possibility for such distortion is provided by the 
notion of obligation or duty, and by related notions of responsibility and blame, 
which, on the surface at least, very much seem to be shared between morality and 
positive law. 'You have an obligation to pay the money' could be said by a moralist 
asserting a moral obligation - or by a judge or state official asserting a legal 
obligation, that is an obligation under some system of positive law. And just as one 
can be under obligations that are legal as well as moral, so one can be held legally 
as well as morally responsible, and legally as well as morally to blame.  
 
In Hume’s view, philosophical accounts of moral obligation, responsibility and 
blame were being distorted through the remodelling of these notions as involving a 
moral form of positive law, and so a moral version of a legal obligation or duty. 
The people doing the remodelling were theologians pretending to be philosophers, 
and importing into moral theory a moral version of the coercive authority involved 
in systems of positive law – a moral law-giver, God, who decreed moral 
obligations as directives and enforced those directives with threats of punishment. 
As a result moral obligation was being understood as a form of legal obligation, 
but applying to humanity in general. And like legal obligations, moral obligations 
would therefore be distorted into a set of directives on the voluntary – on actions 




the basis of a decision to do so, as a means to complying with the directives or to 
avoiding sanctions. 
 
Hume’s target is not imaginary; it exists at least in modern English-language 
philosophy. There are indeed well-known modern philosophers who do want to 
allow obligation a place in morality on these terms – by seeking to understand 
obligation, responsibility and blame in morality in a positivising way, on the basis 
of what these philosophers conceive (accurately or not) to be their role in positive 
law. Anscombe’s ‘Modern moral philosophy’ is one case, where the existence of 
moral obligation is said to depend on a moral lawgiver just as she takes legal 
obligation to depend on a positive lawgiver. But it is important that this theoretical 
urge is not limited to the religious. Instead of tying moral obligation to the 
existence of some suitably cosmic moral lawgiver, such philosophers may seek to 
tie moral obligation to human social pressure instead – some informal analogue of 
the punishments that can enforce legal obligations. 
 
Thus Bernard Williams characterizes moral obligations as, properly understood, 
directing us to meet standards of voluntary behaviour that matter socially. Moral 
obligation 
 
is grounded in the basic issue of what people should be able to rely on. People 
must rely as far as possible on not being killed or used as a resource, and on 
having some space and objects and relations with other people that they can count 
as their own. It also serves their interests if, to some extent at least, they can count 
on not being lied to. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(London: Fontana 1985) p. 185 
 
So the standards on voluntary action which protect these vital interests are properly 
classed as morally obligatory, and are reinforced by social pressure - the 
appropriateness of some kind of reinforcing pressure being, on this view, of the 
essence of obligation in all its forms. Our ethical training, which involves this 
pressure, is designed to leave us strongly motivated towards performing those 
actions which count as morally obligatory, and away from those which count as 
wrong and forbidden. We are left concerned to do what is obligatory and to avoid 
doing what is wrong, and then through this concern thoughts about moral 
obligation motivate us voluntarily to do what is obligatory as a means to 
complying with our moral obligations. So the pressure that comes with moral 
obligatoriness enforces and encourages a certain practical conclusion – in favour of 
some action as morally obligatory: 
 
…moral obligation is expressed in one especially important kind of deliberative 
conclusion - a conclusion that is directed toward what to do...The fact that moral 
obligation is a kind of practical conclusion explains several of its features. An 
obligation applies to someone with respect to an action - it is an obligation to do 
something…  Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy pp. 174-5 
 
The central form of social pressure is blame, whether communicated from without, 
by others, or once one is trained socially, communicated from within, by oneself to 
oneself in self-blame and remorse. Blame, like obligation-enforcing pressure 





…blame always tends to share the particularized, practical character of moral 
obligation in the technical sense. Its negative reaction is focused closely on an action 
or omission, and this is what is blamed. Moreover – although there are many 
inevitable anomalies in its actual working - the aspiration of blame is that it should 
apply only to the extent that the undesired outcome is the product of voluntary action 
on the particular occasion. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy p. 193 
 
(Williams once expressed to me in conversation the view that our understanding of 
moral obligation and responsibility and blame should be informed by the theory of 
legal responsibility proposed by Hart in his idea of sanction-backed law as ideally 
forming a fair choosing system. A system of pressure, in Williams’s view, would 
be fair only if the sanction or pressure could, at least generally, be avoided at will 
or voluntarily, on the basis of a desire or decision to avoid it.) 
 
On these positivising views, which can be found among those who espouse some 
form of virtue theory, there are two very different parts to morality. One part of 
morality is concerned with character and motivation, aspects of the self that are 
non-voluntary and not immediately subject to the will. This is the morality of the 
virtues and vices. Then there is the morality of obligation, which is very different, 
and which is centrally concerned with direction of the voluntary. These two parts 
to morality may be seen as having different foundations: some cultures might be 
thought to lack our morality of obligation entirely, or perhaps the morality of 
obligation that we presently entertain might under certain conditions be better 
dispensed with, as Anscombe suggested. And these distinct parts to morality may 
be seen as having different functions. One, the morality of virtue and vice, seems 
to be linked very closely to appraisal. The virtues are ways in which, through our 
character, we might be more or less morally admirable. Obligation on the other 
hand seems, like law, to be to do with direction – with getting people to do things 
or refrain from doing them.  
 
Hume was not a virtue theorist of this kind. He thought there was no such division 
between distinct parts to morality because morality, properly understood, lacked a 
part directive of the voluntary that was interestingly distinct from the morality of 
virtue or vice. What distinguished breach of moral duty from a more general moral 
disadmirability – from the possession of a vice - was simply the degree of 
disadmirability involved.   
 
A blemish, a fault, a vice, a crime; these expressions seem to denote different 
degrees of censure and disapprobation; which are, however, all of them, at the 
bottom, pretty nearly of the same kind or species. David Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals appendix iv p. 322. 
 
Moral duty moreover, in Hume’s view, is a standard that immediately applies not 
to voluntary actions, but to non-voluntary states of motivation and character. One 
violates duty in morality as a parent, not just through failing to look after one's 
children, but by lacking affection for them. This, in Hume's view, is the 
fundamental moral wrong, at the point of motivation, of which the neglect of 
children at the point of the voluntary is but a symptom or effect. 
 
We blame a father for neglecting his child. Why? because it shows a want of natural 




of children cou'd not be a duty; and 'twere impossible we cou'd have the duty in our 
eye in the attention we give to our offspring. David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978) p. 478 
 
Hume is best understood by relating him to the natural law tradition of the early 
modern period. This is a tradition in both ethical and legal theory that dominated 
not only the Catholic world but much of the Protestant world as well. It provided 
the context of Hume’s legal education. It involved distinctive approaches both to 
the theory of normativity and to the theory of law, and in ways that were 
importantly connected, and which centred on an account of obligation both in 
moral and in positive legal form. At the heart of the natural law tradition was a 
view that moral duty or obligation is a form of law, indeed it is one aspect of law 
in its primary, moral form. But this theory of a moral law did not at all involve the 
distortion of which Hume complained – of moral obligation into a set of directives 
on the voluntary. 
 
John Gardner has criticized the natural law tradition for thinking of morality as 
itself ever taking the form of law: 
 
Natural law, in the tradition of that name, is not the same thing as human law. It is 
the higher thing to which human law answers. We may regret that members of the 
tradition feel a need to present morality as a kind of law, which it is not. For a start, 
morality is not a system (and it is not made up of systems) and nor does it make 
claims, pursue aims, or have institutions or officials, all of which features are 
essential to the nature of law. Nevertheless, even as we resist the idea that morality 
is a kind of law, we should endorse the idea that morality is entirely natural. It binds 
us by our nature as human beings, while law binds us, to the extent that it does, only 
by the grace of morality. ‘Nearly natural law’ in John Gardner, Law as a Leap 
of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 
pp. 193-4 
 
But what Gardner views as essential to law as such, was viewed by many within 
the natural law tradition as needed at most for law’s positive version. For early 
modern natural law theory, especially in the scholastic form of that tradition, fully 
took on board the existence of moral obligation as something independent of such 
features of legal positivity as courts, legislators and officials and their aims - while 
believing in a distinctively moral law nonetheless. This is because that natural law 
tradition viewed law in its primary form not as a humanity-wide version of positive 
law, but as a distinctive kind of normativity, a normativity of law, that was united 
with at least well-functioning cases of positive legal obligation by involving a 
common form of normative binding – obligation in its moral form. And this theory 
of normativity came with a theory of human nature – and especially of what in 
human nature is of ethical significance. According to the tradition it is certain 
ethically highly significant capacities within human nature that allow ethical 
normativity to take, under certain conditions, the special form of law. 
 
Normativity is the property, that moral or ethical standards clearly have, of making 
some sort of call on us to meet them. This can involve a directive aspect, and an 
appraisive, a division to which I shall return. In moral law, for the natural law 
tradition, moral normativity takes a distinctive form. Besides affording us moral 




call on us to respond that is distinctively demanding – that idea of normative 
demand is central to the very idea of moral obligation – and that addresses a 
special responsibility for how we act. So a normativity of law involves, in 
obligation, a set of demands on action that we are distinctively responsible for 
meeting. Contrast the importantly different form of normativity that is advisability, 
or the call to be sensible. This is not demanding in the same way – the sensible is 
not obligatory but simply what would be a good idea. And there is no suggestion 
that the sensible has to do with a special responsibility for action. Non-actions such 
as passive fears and desires can be sensible or foolish.   
 
What does this demanding form of normativity, this normativity of law, involve, if 
it exists, and how does it relate to the human capacity for action?  We shall see that 
the natural law answer to this contained two elements. First it involved a 
distinctive view of normativity in general, and one that put great emphasis on the 
appraisive side of morality. While the second element has to do with the human 
capacity that law governs and directs. This was not what Hume took law to direct – 
a capacity to do things voluntarily. Rather the capacity that law directs was, 
instead, the capacity for self-determination. Action matters to law, not because 
action is something we perform voluntarily, or on the basis of a will so to act, but 
because action is a locus of self-determination: we have, to a significant degree, a 
capacity to determine for ourselves what we do or refrain from doing, so that we 
can be distinctively, morally, responsible for what we do or omit doing. 
 
Voluntariness is the capacity to do things on the basis of a pro attitude towards 
doing them, such as on the basis of a decision or desire to do them. Self-
determination, by contrast, is the idea of capacity to determine for oneself what 
one does. The two kinds of capacity are not obviously the same. Both involve 
kinds of power – kinds of capacity to produce or determine outcomes. But the 
powers, and their bearers, are importantly different.  
 
Voluntariness involves a power not immediately of oneself but of one’s 
motivations. And it is very clearly a one-way power: that is, the power can exist as 
a power to determine but one outcome. As Locke long ago reminded us, to have 
the capacity to do A on the basis of deciding to do A is not necessarily to have the 
capacity voluntarily to refrain. To use Locke's example: I can possess and be 
exercising a power to stay in my room on the basis of wanting to; but, unbeknown 
to me, the door may be locked, and I altogether lack the power to leave should I so 
want.1   
 
Self-determination, on the other hand, is, by its very nature, a power of the self. 
And it involves the self in a way somehow distinguished from other determinants. 
The thought is that in exercising self-determination, you somehow determine for 
yourself what you do or decide. What more specifically this idea of determining 
things for oneself involves is a central philosophical debate. It gives rise, in 
particular to the controversy between compatibilists and incompatibilists about the 
power. Is determining for oneself what one does consistent with what one does 
 
1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch  (Oxford: 





also being determined by things and occurrences other than oneself? Moreover 
self-determination may or may not be a one-way power. Ordinary intuition seems 
to suggest that it is not one-way. The intuitive conception of self-determination (it 
might or might not prove to be the right one) is of an inherently multi-way power, 
freedom, conceived as by its very nature a power to determine more than one 
outcome, extending over alternatives or distinct options and leaving it up to you 
which of these alternatives you do. On this intuitive conception, to determine for 
oneself what one does is to possess and exercise control over which actions one 
performs.2 
 
How far does self-determination matter ethically? It does not seem to be generally 
presupposed in ethics. Much in human life is of ethical significance apart from any 
capacity for self-determination we might possess. We can be criticized for 
deficiencies in our motivations, dispositions, beliefs, and indeed in our actions – 
but just for those defective occurrences, without the issue arising whether we had 
the capacity to determine or prevent those defective occurrences for ourselves. And 
the criticism can be obviously moral; the criticism can be for a failure to respect 
the interests of others or the justifications those interests provide. And such are the 
metaphysical problems raised by self-determination – some philosophers have 
thought the very idea of such a capacity incoherent – that many in the modern 
English-language ethical tradition have sought to exploit the availability of these 
forms of ethical criticism to deny that self-determination is of any ethical 
significance at all. There has been a project in ethical and legal theory of sidelining 
or bypassing the whole issue of self-determination as much as possible. One 
function of appeals to voluntariness in modern ethical and legal theory has 
undoubtedly been to pursue this project – to replace self-determination with 
something else.   
 
But self-determination does look significant when we consider one ethical 
criticism in particular, moral blame. Moral blame might be taken to be no more 
than moral criticism – criticism for some moral defect of motivation, disposition or 
action. R.M. Adams understands it in just these terms 
 
Perhaps for some people the word ‘blame’ has connotations that it does not have 
for me. To me, it seems strange to say that I do not blame someone though I think 
poorly of him, believing that his motives are thoroughly selfish. Intuitively 
speaking, I should have said that thinking poorly of a person in this way is a form 
of unspoken blame.  R. M. Adams, ‘Involuntary sins’, Philosophical Review, 
94 (1985) 1-35, p. 21. 
 
But the selfishness of someone’s motivation does not of itself settle a further 
question, and one which is very plainly raised in blame - namely their 
responsibility for the motivation they possess. Someone’s selfishness or 
unreasonableness is one thing, and it is clearly leaves them unadmirable just as 
selfish or unreasonable. It is still a further question whether their possession of 
such a character is their fault. There is no inconsistency at all in criticizing 
 
2 For further examination of self-determination see my The Ethics of Action, volume I, 





someone as having a selfish or unreasonable character, while wondering or 
doubting whether their possession of this character really is their fault.  
 
In moral blame, the agent is not merely criticized for some fault in their action, 
attitude or character. Moral blame involves a further step: the fault is put down to 
them as their fault. This putting a fault down to someone as their fault is essential 
to the content of blame. And it is at this point that a power on the agent's part 
comes in. We are going beyond dispositions or states of the agent or occurrences in 
their life, and criticism of the agent just for these, such as for being selfish or 
unreasonable, and addressing the agent as having a further responsibility for these 
states and occurrences - for their selfishness or unreasonableness. And this brings 
in the agent not just as someone involved in these states or occurrences but as 
determinant of them. Why should these faults on the agent's part be their fault 
unless they had a power to determine their occurrence for themselves - or a power 
to prevent which, though possessed by the agent, they failed to exercise? 
  
I noted that voluntariness has been used to bypass the whole issue of self-
determination. And as we shall see it was so used, in his ethical and especially in 
his legal theory, by Thomas Hobbes, who did expressly deny the very possibility 
of self-determination in any form. But there has been a tradition, English language 
compatibilism in its classical form, that has sought to appeal to voluntariness not to 
bypass self-determination, but to explain it, in a way that promises to be 
metaphysically unproblematic. The agent is identified with certain occurrences in 
his life – his motivations: what they determine, the agent determines for himself.  
The concept of the power to determine for ourselves what we do is supposed to 
come to no more than that of the power to act as we will. But as a model of self-
determination this proposal faces many difficulties. 
 
First it threatens to makes the truth of compatibilism rather trivial, following 
immediately from the very nature of self-determination. Determination by the self 
is reduced to determination by something other than the self – by an occurrence for 
which, if regress is to be avoided, the self is obviously not responsible. Now some 
form of compatibilism about self-determination may in the end prove true. But 
self-determination, as we ordinarily understand it, the idea of determining for 
oneself what one what does, far from immediately delivering compatibilism, leaves 
incompatibilism a theoretical option that is at least very intelligible, and, for many, 
immediately appealing. The proposed conceptual reduction does nothing to explain 
why this should be. 
 
Secondly, identifying self-determination with voluntariness does not do justice to 
moral blame as an ethically distinctive criticism. As we have already noted, 
ordinary ethical criticism criticizes the person by reference to some deficiency in a 
state or occurrence in the life of that person. We criticize someone as selfish or 
unreasonable because they hold or are disposed to hold attitudes that are selfish or 
unreasonable. The criticism is of defective states and of the person just as 
possessing those defective states. Blame, on the other hand, does not simply 
criticize someone for deficiencies in their attitudes or other states but puts their 
possession of such states down to them as their fault. This supposes something 
more - a problem not simply with events and states in the agent's life, but with the 




in terms of voluntariness removes this distinctive element. The supposed problem 
with the agent as determiner is turned back into a problem that primarily involves 
an event or state within their life, a motivation, and the agent as possessor of the 
event or state. What then is left of the idea that the agent is especially responsible, 
in a way that goes beyond ordinary ethical criticizability?  
 
But there exists a third and, for our purposes, very significant problem. The power 
of self-determination, as we ordinarily understand it, immediately applies to and 
extends over the non-voluntary. For it applies, in particular, to decisions of the 
will. We determine for ourselves not only the actions we decide to perform, but our 
decisions to perform them. We do blame people and hold them directly morally 
responsible for their own decisions. Action, as what we can determine for 
ourselves, includes decisions to act, as well as the actions decided upon. But, as 
Hobbes pointed out, decisions are not themselves subject to the will: 
 
I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will, but to say, I can will if I will, I take 
to be an absurd speech. Hobbes The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity 
and Chance (London 1656) p. 29 
 
Decisions to do A are not taken on the basis of decisions so to decide, in response 
to the desirability of deciding to do A. Decisions to do A are taken non-voluntarily, 
not in response to their own desirability but in response to the desirability of their 
objects – the voluntary actions A decided upon and the various reason-giving 
features that those voluntary actions have. 
 
The natural law tradition built its theory of law not on the idea of a set of directives 
on the voluntary, but on the idea of a set of directives on our capacity for self-
determination. And this affected not only the theory of moral law, but the theory of 
positive law as well. The scope of positive legal obligation was certainly limited – 
but not by a restriction to direction of the voluntary. That way of restricting law 
was to be the contribution of the natural law tradition’s most radical critic – 
Thomas Hobbes. 
 
So I shall now examine the general problems to which Hume and the natural 
lawyers gave very different answers, and then look at the natural law tradition 
more specifically. We shall see that Hume’s own relation to that tradition was 
interestingly complex. In his general normative theory, and his emphasis on a 
theory of appraisal, he retained a fundamental element of the natural law tradition. 
But in his theory of law he had fully assimilated a furious rejection of that tradition 




2. Normativity - direction and appraisal 
 
We can distinguish two aspects to normativity.  First, there is a directive function.  
Standards that are normative for us may possess a directive role.  They may point 
us in a given direction or at least support us taking it; and are strongly directive 
when they point us in that direction and away from any other - when they not only 




address a capacity to respond to that direction - to register or cognize the direction 
being given, and to respond to and follow that direction, or at least attempt to. 
 
But secondly there is an appraisive aspect to normativity. People who meet or 
exceed standards that are normative may be praised or judged favourably for 
having done so; while those who breach or fail to meet the standards may be 
criticized or judged unfavourably for this failure. So besides any capacity we might 
have to register direction and respond to it, there are the capacities and activities 
that normative standards serve to appraise. Besides providing various kinds of 
direction, normative standards support various forms of appraisal; and there may 
be a variety in the kinds of normativity involved, corresponding to the different 
sorts of capacity and activity appraised. 
 
These two aspects to normativity, the directive and the appraisive, are importantly 
distinct. Obviously, there can be standards of appraisal that apply to objects that 
cannot be directed. A vase's goodness has to do with its form and utility, not with 
its responsiveness to any form of direction. And even as humans the capacities for 
which we are appraised need not have much to with our responsiveness to 
direction either. People are praised for being amusing or for being inventive. But 
neither talent need be easily subject to direction or much dependent on 
receptiveness to direction. At the same time standards may serve to give direction 
without supporting much by way of appraisal of those being directed: consider an 
instruction manual. Obviously one could use the manual as a basis for appraising 
people in terms of whether they followed it correctly or not. But this would be 
vastly peripheral to the main point of the manual - which is simply to provide a set 
of directions. 
 
Ethical standards give direction. They guide us to do what is right and good, and to 
avoid what is wrong and bad. But they also serve as a very important basis of 
appraisal both of agents and of the actions they perform, and in a way that seems 
profoundly connected to direction. The term 'a good thing to do' may communicate 
a directive in support of performing the action in question. But the term 'good' also 
serves favorably to appraise the action, as well as to appraise the agent who 
performs it. If the action is a good thing to do, it may have been good of the agent 
to perform it. The combination of the directive and the appraisive is central to 
ethical standards as we ordinarily understand them. But how to relate the 
appraisive and directive in morality? 
 
Is direction primary? In which case understanding ethical standards begins with the 
basic notion of a directive to do something; and appraisal is then explained in 
terms of the theory of direction: the capacity addressed by ethical standards is 
simply the capacity to receive and respond to ethical direction, and ethical 
appraisal of agents is then for whether they follow ethical directives or not. Or 
perhaps direction is not primary. Perhaps the appraisive side of ethical standards 
should be viewed as in certain respects importantly independent of and even 
explanatory of the directive. It may be that ethical appraisal is of capacities that go 
significantly beyond the capacity to respond to ethical direction. And these further 
capacities and their ethical significance may then inform and shape not only ethical 





In recent philosophy a very common assumption has been that quite generally, or 
at least in the moral sphere, normativity is identical with reason. Standards that are 
normative for us, it is assumed, are just standards that it is reasonable for us to 
meet. Indeed, the identity of normativity with reason is typically presented as if it 
were immediate or obvious: 
 
Aspects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute 
reasons for persons, that is, grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, 
intentions, or actions appropriate or inappropriate.   
'Explaining normativity: on rationality and the justification of reason' in 
Joseph Raz Engaging Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 
66 
 
If as philosophers we identify normativity with reason, then we may be inclined to 
concentrate our attention on the directive side of normative standards, as opposed 
to their agent-appraisive function. And indeed, it is direction and our capacity to 
respond to it that has dominated much recent philosophical discussion of 
normativity. This is because in relation to reason it seems to be agent-direction 
rather than agent-appraisal that takes central stage. Standards that are clearly and 
overtly of reason are indeed used to appraise agents; but it seems they are used to 
appraise agents just in terms of their responsiveness to rational direction. So in 
relation to reason, it seems to be the directive side of normativity that is primary, 
the appraisive side to be explained in terms of the directive. 
 
Reason provides directions in the form of justifications. And rational justifications 
appear to be immediately justifications for or against forming and holding 
psychological attitudes, whether beliefs, or emotions, desires, intentions and 
various kinds of content-bearing motivations for action generally.
3
 The 
justifications derive from possible objects of thought at which content-bearing 
attitudes might be directed, and from the various justification-providing properties 
those objects of thought might have – such as likelihood of truth in the case of 
belief, features that make the object desirable in the case of desires and other 
motivations. These justifications direct us towards the attitudes that they support, 
and away from the attitudes they oppose. 
 
Favourable rational appraisal, or what is clearly and overtly such, makes use of 
terms such as ‘reasonable’, ‘sensible’, ‘rational’ and so forth; and unfavourable 
rational appraisal correspondingly uses terms such as ‘foolish’, ‘less than sensible’, 
‘unreasonable’, ‘irrational’, and the like. It is very plausible that to be subject to 
appraisal in such terms at all – to count at all either as reasonable or as 
unreasonable – is always to have some capacity to cognize and respond to 
justifications and the direction that they provide, whether that capacity be 
exercised competently or incompetently. Lower animals, such as sharks and mice, 
which are clearly quite incapable of recognizing or responding to justifications, 
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Judgment-sensitive attitudes constitute the class of things for which reasons in the 
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equally clearly fall outside the sphere of reason.  In other words, they are a-
rational, and no more capable of being genuinely foolish or unreasonable than they 
are capable of being sensible or reasonable. Lacking any capacity to respond to 
rational direction, such lower animals are beyond rational criticism or appraisal. 
 
Not only does rational appraisal presuppose some capacity in the agent appraised 
to respond to rational direction. Rational appraisal seems also to be precisely for 
our responsiveness to such direction. The reasonable agent is just one who is 
responsive to rational direction – who is moved by justifications to form the 
attitudes justified; and an unreasonable agent is one who fails to respond properly 
to justifications – who despite having the general capacity to respond to reason, is 
unmoved by certain justifications, or who is moved instead to form those attitudes 
that the justifications oppose. It is tempting to think that the capacity addressed by 
standards of rational appraisal - the capacity for rationality or reasonableness – is 
just the capacity to respond to rational direction.   
 
If we identify all normativity purely and simply with reason, then we may be 
tempted to adopt the position that I shall call ethical rationalism. This view does 
not simply regard ethical standards as reasons – a claim I should myself incline to 
support - but claims that the capacity addressed and governed by ethical standards 
is simply the general capacity to respond to rational direction.
4
 According to the 
ethical rationalist, there is nothing more to ethical direction than general rational 
direction as applied to moral questions; and ethical appraisal is just of the capacity 
to respond to rational direction. Hence for the ethical rationalist it is the directive 
aspect of normativity that is fundamental to ethical theory. 
 
But the identity of ethical normativity with reason is hardly trivial. For otherwise 
the ethical project of David Hume would be unintelligible – which it seems not to 
be. Hume certainly allows that ethical standards are normative for us; he supposes 
that ethical standards make a call on us to meet them, and support appraisal of us 
in terms of whether or not we meet the standards. But he denies that the call is that 
of reason, and that ethical appraisal is of us as reasonable or unreasonable.   
 
Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or 
unreasonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable 
or unreasonable.  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature p. 458 
 
Hume replaces the notion of reason in the theory of ethical normativity with that of 
merit. Merit is a particular form of personal goodness or admirability. It is 
admirability in relation to arts or skills – what Hume also refers to as talent. And 
for Hume moral admirability or virtue is just another form of talent. The supposed 
distinction between moral virtue and talent is, in Hume’s view, wholly verbal.
5
 The 
moral person is good at morals and so admirable or estimable in moral terms as, 
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 …"being responsible" is mainly a matter of the appropriateness of demanding 
reasons…  What We Owe to Each Other p. 22  
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say, the able singer is good at singing and so estimable in terms of standards 
supplied by the art of singing.   
 
The assimilation of virtue to talent, of moral admirability to a form of merit, tends 
to broaden the focus of a theory of ethical normativity from being narrowly on 
reason – which is what Hume intended. It also prevents the theory of ethical 
normativity from assuming a primacy of the directive over the appraisive. For to 
possess talent is obviously not in general a mode of being reasonable, just as to 
lack talent is not in general to be unreasonable. There are plenty of arts and skills 
that are not greatly dependent on, still less a function of our reason; consider, for 
example, a talent for song or ballet. And to be appraisable as good or bad in terms 
of an art or skill may or may not be to possess a capacity to respond to any 
particular form of direction, let alone to that provided by reason. Some talents may 
consist in a largely undirectable knack; and their exercise be largely an expression 
of that knack. Consider again wit, or the talent to amuse. 
 
How far merit appraisal is of our capacity to respond to any form of direction 
depends on the nature of the art or skill in question, and of the kinds of capacity 
which practice of the art or skill involves. The immediate question raised by the 
appeal to merit is the question that ethical rationalism assumes from the very start 
to have been answered – what kinds of capacity are involved in morality, and what 
kind of practice is it that involves their exercise? Is more involved than just some 
general capacity to respond to rational direction? What is it that we are appraising 
when we appraise people ethically? 
 
Hume needed the appeal to merit because he had already denied himself any 
recourse to reason. And that is because Hume’s psychological theory committed 
him to a complete denial of the very possibility of any form of practical reason – of 
reason, that is, in a form governing what ethical standards centrally apply to, 
namely motivations and the actions which those motivations guide and explain. 
According to Hume, motivations are contentless feelings, akin to sensations of 
pain and pleasure.  
 
When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have 
no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more 
than five foot high.  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature p. 415 
 
Motivations, as contentless feelings, are not attitudes towards some object of 
thought in terms of which they might be justified. So motivations and the actions 
they explain are, in Hume’s view, subject neither to rational direction nor to 
rational appraisal. Reason, to the extent that Hume admits the notion, is simply 
directive of belief.  
 
Even if we do not find this wholesale denial of practical reason credible, there is 
still a question how far ethical normativity in particular is a normativity of reason.  
For the view that laudable and blameable are not the same as reasonable or 
unreasonable is clearly right in the general case. As we have noted there can be 
merit and demerit in relation to arts and skills that does not consist in reason or 
unreason. We certainly can praise and criticize people other than as reasonable or 




rationality or reasonableness or its lack. And even in the ethical case it is not 
obvious that praise and criticism are as reasonable or unreasonable. For the most 
immediate terms of ethical appraisal are surely not ‘reasonable’ and 
‘unreasonable’, still less ‘sensible’ and ‘foolish’, but, exactly as Hume supposed, 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Immoral people are bad people – that seems obvious. It is not 
quite so obvious that they are unreasonable, still less that they are foolish; which is 
why establishing that immorality is contrary to reason has in the past seemed to 
many a substantial philosophical problem. 
 
At the same time, Hume’s scepticism about practical reason is based on a 
psychology that renders very problematic any satisfactory theory of ethical 
direction. Hume certainly did not deny that ethical standards serve to direct us.  
Such a denial would have been quite incredible. But the form this direction took is 
left rather mysterious. For Hume, as we have noted, motivations are not content-
bearing attitudes formed in response to some object of thought – an object that 
might serve as justification for the attitudes. Motivations, for Hume, are just 
contentless feelings, that no are no more attitudes towards an object than is (say) a 
stab of pain; and, as we have seen, that is fundamental to his general scepticism 
about practical reason. But how is someone to be directed into or out of feeling a 
contentless sensation, such as a pain or pleasure? There is no satisfactory account 
of how mere feelings might be sensitive to normative direction.   
 
But it is very important to our conception of ethical appraisal, whether as good or 
as bad, that it really is of agents who are capable of ethical direction. Just as to be 
unreasonable, as opposed to falling a-rationally outside the sphere of reason as 
might a shark or a mouse, an agent must have at least some capacity to respond to 
rational direction; so, too, to be genuinely immoral, it might be thought, an agent 
must have at least some capacity to understand and respond to ethical direction.   
 
Badness in terms of many arts or skills – being bad at them – may, when 
sufficiently pronounced, detach the talentless from any capacity even to be directed 
towards excellence. But immorality seems different. To be morally very bad 
arguably always presupposes some capacity for being directed ethically - and at the 
very least therefore some cognitive grasp at least of the kinds of ethical standard 
being disregarded. If that capacity is absent then one is not immoral or bad in 
moral terms. One falls outside the class of those who are morally appraisable. A 
shark is not morally bad any more than a shark is foolish. Quite incapable of being 
directed ethically, sharks fall outside morality just as they fall outside reason. 
 
We now have the basis of two contrary positions, occupying opposing extremes. 
The first is what I have called ‘ethical rationalism’. This certainly provides a 
theory of ethical direction - one taken from a general theory of rational direction. 
Yet nothing more is said about moral practice and about moral appraisal in relation 
to that practice than that the capacity involved and appraised is the capacity to 
receive and respond to rational direction. But if nothing more than that were 
involved, why would ethical appraisal be immediately intelligible in terms that are 
not obviously and immediately those of rational appraisal? Why does ethical 
appraisal immediately involve terms familiar from general merit appraisal, which 
takes the form of appraisal of agents as good or bad - terms which leave it to some 




Our immediate understanding of immorality is as moral badness; and this leaves 
the relation between immorality and reason open to debate. For Hume was 
perfectly right to note that where a person or action is concerned, good is not the 
same as reasonable, nor is bad the same as unreasonable.  
 
On the other extreme we have the reason-scepticism of Hume, which treats the 
appraisive function of ethical standards as primary. Ethical standards are 
introduced just as standards of merit or personal admirability. But the disavowal of 
any appeal to reason leaves a void as far as explaining ethical direction is 
concerned. Hume thought that he could accommodate the directiveness of ethical 
standards; and, in particular, that he could accommodate even the directiveness of 
obligation. But it is not clear that his appraisive model supplies, on its own, the 
required basis for explaining ethical direction. 
 
We now have two distinct problems to consider. The first problem concerns law 
and the human capacities addressed by law. Does law govern and direct a capacity 
to do things voluntarily, on the basis of a will so to act?  Or does law direct 
something that may be importantly very different – such as a capacity for self-
determination? The second is about ethical normativity, and the relation between 
direction and appraisal. How far need a theory of ethical direction be informed by 
a theory of ethical appraisal and of various human capacities subject to that 
appraisal? The natural law tradition combined answers to both these problems – 
and combined them in a theory of moral obligation as involving a distinctive 
normativity of law. 
 
 
3.  Obligation and direction  
 
Where obligation is concerned direction looms large. Suarez for example always 
uses the term vis directiva or directive force to refer to obligation, never to advice 
or counsel. Whatever might be true of other forms of normativity, perhaps to 
understand obligation we need a theory that appeals immediately to something 
distinctive at the level of direction. 
 
There is, after all, the connection that we have already noted between obligation 
and positive law. Legislative authorities impose obligations – legal obligations; 
and it seems that they do this to direct us. Of course people can be appraised in 
terms of their responsiveness to such direction, in positive terms as law-abiding or 
in negative terms as, say, disobedient or criminal. But the primary function of legal 
obligations and the like, it is natural to think, is not to serve as standards of 
appraisal, but to guide populations subject to legal authority in one direction rather 
than another. In so far as the case of positive law is viewed as central to 
understanding moral obligation, so too direction will appear key to the normativity 
that moral obligation involves. 
 
But there is a more fundamental consideration that would appeal even to natural 
lawyers suspicious of using legal positivity as a model for the moral case. 
Obligations do not merely propose an option or suggest it. They oppose others. 
They require that those subject to them do one thing rather than any other. It seems 




strongly directive, in the sense already defined. In communicating a moral 
obligation one is asserting normative support, in this case obligatoriness, for one 
option - that of doing A. But simultaneously, and this is essential to the specific 
direction being given to do A, the failure to do A is left subject to normative 
criticism also. The very support given for doing A implies corresponding 
normative opposition to the failure to do A. If doing A is obligatory, then to fail to 
do A is to do wrong. Perhaps then what distinguishes obligation is indeed its strong 
directiveness. 
 
But strong directiveness does not in fact distinguish obligation from 
recommendation. For advice can be strongly directive in this way too. True, advice 
is recommendatory rather than demanding. But recommendations can be strongly 
directive when they assert that doing A is the only sensible thing to do. For then it 
follows that the failure to do A is subject to normative criticism too - as foolish or 
as less than sensible. Granted much advice need not be strongly directive: it can be 
asserted that it would be sensible enough or a good idea to do A, but without any 
implication that doing B instead might not be sensible too. But then the 
normativity of obligation can take a weakly directive form too, as permission. 
Doing A can be normatively supported as permissible, in that refraining from 
doing A is not obligatory; but doing B instead may be permissible too.   
 
So the difference between obligation and advice is not that one form of normativity 
is strongly directive and the other is not, but that one normativity is directive in a 
demanding way, and the other is directive in a recommendatory or advisory way. 
There is an essential difference in their force that seems not to be a difference in 
the strength of their directiveness. Which suggests that we may not be able to 
explain the difference between the two forms of normativity just by appeal to 
normative direction.   
 
What distinguishes the advisable and the obligatory? It appears that each can be as 
directive as the other. The difference lies in the terms in which equally strong 
direction is communicated in each case. And these are terms of appraisal - that are 
distinguished by the kind of criticism they make of agents for disregarding the 
relevant form of strong direction. Someone who disregards strong direction that 
comes with the force of advice is foolish. While someone who disregards strong 
direction that comes with the force of duty or obligation is subject to a different 
criticism. That person is a wrongdoer, and - if without excuse - is fully responsible 
and to blame for having done wrong. To explain the difference between obligation 
and advice we need then to turn to the theory of normative appraisal and to an 
account of the nature and significance of the capacities and activities subject to 
such appraisal - capacities that go beyond what mere direction and responsiveness 
to it involve. And this will be our view. But we should consider the appeal to 
normative direction further, for there is more to be said on its behalf. 
 
It might be admitted that advisability and obligation can both be strongly directive, 
but that moral obligation is distinguished by something that reinforces direction at 
least at the motivational level and that Bernard Williams appealed to – the 





Perhaps, it might be thought, the pressure just involves being held publicly to 
account. 6  The pressure is the public communication of criticism. But if the 
pressure involves nothing more than the public communication of criticism – 
holding someone to account for their normative failure – it is hard to distinguish 
breach of obligation from other cases of normative failure, such as folly. 
 
For it might be thought equally appropriate, or even as much part of one's basic 
obligation to a neighbour or fellow human being, to bring their folly to their 
attention, at least where the folly might impose significant costs, if not on others 
even just on themselves. If someone is making a silly mistake that will profoundly 
damage themselves or others, under many circumstances it may be basic charity 
forcefully to point the matter out. It is the costs that follow, and the concern of 
those to any caring fellow human being, that are crucial, and not whether it is 
through some lack of sense or actual breach of obligation that those costs arise. 
 
Moreover it is a presupposition of much communication that theoretical folly is 
perfectly the business of others publicly to correct. There is a practice of public 
accountability for sense or folly in expressed belief that is as central to our culture 
as public accountability in any other form. So appropriateness of public criticism 
may not straightforwardly distinguish obligation from other forms of normativity.   
 
If it is claimed that breach of obligation peculiarly warrants not just expressed 
criticism, but the threat of genuine sanctions going beyond mere criticism - some 
unmistakable coercion - then again the distinctiveness of obligation is left arguable 
at best. For whatever might be true of legal obligatoriness, not all breach of moral 
obligation is obviously to be prevented by coercion. And perhaps if persistence in 
folly would do great damage, then for the good of others or even just of themselves 
the fool too can be forced to stop. At any rate the issue seems very debatable, and 
not immediately settled by the very distinction between obligatoriness and 
advisability.   
 
It might be more promising to leave pressure and sanctions, and return to reason 
itself, and some other distinctive form that rational direction might take where 
obligation is concerned. This time, it is not the strength of the direction provided, 
or not that alone, but the way that opposing options are rationally opposed – in a 
way that involves a rational limitation to the agent’s competence to assess and act 
on reasons. This is the now familiar idea of exclusionary reasons, associated often 
with forms of positive legal direction. 7  Could this explain the very idea of 
obligation itself?8  
 
6 For a theory of obligation that appeals to public accountability, see Stephen Darwall, The 
Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006) 
 
7 For the theory of exclusionary reasons see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
 
8 For an attempt to explain moral obligation in terms of exclusionary reasons see John 
Gardner and Timothy Macklem’s ‘Reasons’ in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy of Law eds Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University 





There may be situations where we have reason to act, to use Joseph Raz’s vivid 
phrase, other on the basis of the ‘merits of the case’.9 We may have a reason to do 
A that is also a reason to act other than on the basis of a balance of reasons – the 
merits of the case - for and against doing A. Those further reasons are not 
rationally outweighed but are rationally excluded. For example, we may be too 
tired to appraise the reasons for and against making a particular investment. Given 
our tiredness, we have reason to refrain from investing, but other than on the basis 
of any view of the merits of that investment. Or it may be the business of some 
coordinative authority to work out the balance of reasons for and against a 
particular course of action, and then to issue a legal directive. The directive gives 
each of us subject to the authority reason just to act as directed, other than on the 
basis of our own particular view of the merits of the action. As Raz observes, in 
such cases, intuitively, there is a potential tension in our view of the rationality of 
what the agent does - between a view based on the merits of the case, and a 
possibly conflicting view based on what the agent had reason to do, given their 
reason not to act on the basis of those merits. We may in some cases endorse the 
investment, but disapprove of the agent for making it when tired. Or we may 
endorse the agent’s action because it conformed to an authority’s direction, but 
criticize it as, considered just on its merits, the wrong course of action.10 
 
So does moral obligation consist in, or at least imply, a distinctive form of rational 
direction - direction in exclusionary form? Or do we have here an important 
complexity in the theory of rational direction, that has to do with how rationally to 
accommodate limitations in individual rationality – limitations that might, for 
example, have to do with an individual’s own incapacity, or with the need to 
coordinate action at the collective level; but which, like directive strength, has 
nothing specifically to do with the distinction between advisability and obligation?  
 
As the case of the tired investor shows, a reason that excludes us from acting on 
the merits of the case need not impose an obligation. It could be merely foolish to 
make an investment when tired, not a breach of duty. But perhaps exclusionary 
force is still essential to moral obligation and a necessary constituent of it.  
 
On this proposal, moral obligation and what gives rise to it always serves 
rationally to limit our competence to decide and act on the merits of a case. The 
obligation to perform an action always exists in potential tension with the merits of 
so acting. But that is not a plausible view of obligation in general. Take some 
vulnerable person’s need and the duty on us to help them that that need may 
impose. The duty is not in tension with the merits of providing the help. The 
person’s need demands that we meet it – but not by rationally detaching us from 
the merits of the case. Whether there is need, and whether the need is demanding – 
this is central to any case for and against providing help. Where providing help is 
concerned, the need and its demanding nature is a central feature of the case - a 
 
 
9 See Practical Reason and Norms p. 37. 
 
10 For the intuitiveness of such a tension as key to identifying exclusionary reasons, see 




basic aspect of the practical situation. To remove the need, or to remove it as 
something morally demanding, is not to remove some rational barrier to our acting 
on the case’s merits. It is drastically to change the case. 
 
How is the vulnerable person’s need a basic feature of the case – and in a way that 
involves obligation? Key is something about which the appeal to exclusionary 
reasons, and ethical rationalism generally, is entirely silent. Ignoring the person’s 
need would, given their vulnerability, be bad. One basic element in a balance of 
reasons can be the fact that to perform a particular action, or to omit it, would be 
morally very bad. This moral badness lies at the heart of our conception of the 
action, or its omission, as wrong and a breach of obligation. And this no more 
exists as a limitation in our competence to act on the merits of the case than does 
the fact that to perform an action, or to omit it, would be foolish.  
 
This brings us back to what lies at the heart of our conception of moral obligation 
– a theory of ethical good and bad. To understand moral obligation as action-
directive law we need to turn to a distinctive form of normative appraisal, as good 
and bad, and characterize the distinctively demanding direction provided by moral 
obligation in terms of that. And the kinds of capacity subject to appraisal to which 
such a theory may avert may go considerably beyond any capacity to respond to 
rational direction.  
 
 
4. The natural law tradition and the appeal to appraisal 
 
By the early modern period the natural law tradition had come to formulate a 
theory of moral law that was, in effect, a via media between ethical rationalism 
with its prioritisation of normative direction, and reason-scepticism with its 
exclusive attention to normative appraisal. As natural law, moral obligation 
provides a form of rational direction, and so addresses a capacity to respond to that 
direction. But the peculiarly demanding and action-specific direction that comes 
with obligation is explained in terms of a theory of ethical appraisal, and by 
reference to capacities subject to that appraisal that do indeed go beyond a simple 
capacity to respond to rational direction. The theory of normative direction is a 
theory of practical reason. But this theory is informed by a theory of normative 
appraisal that goes beyond a simple theory of rationality and reason. And this is a 
theory of appraisal elements of which eventually survived, detached from the 
general theory of rational direction, to form Hume's theory of merit. 
 
Aquinas thought, just as did Hume, that moral obligation is linked to a negative 
form of moral appraisal. As for Hume, moral obligation is a standard to breach 
which is to be disadmirable or bad. Wrongdoing involves demerit. But, by contrast 
to Hume, the negative appraisal that relates to breach of moral obligation is not just 
ordinary negative evaluation, but takes a distinctive form - as moral blame. 
 
Blame for doing wrong is distinctively condemnatory because, as we have already 
observed, it does not just detect a fault in the agent’s action, but attributes that fault 
to the agent as their fault, condemning the agent himself. Aquinas understood this 
putting the fault in the agent down to them as their fault in evaluative terms. What 




this condemnation of the agent as bad to have done what he did presupposes a 
central and distinguishing human capacity - the capacity for freedom: 
 
Hence a human action is worthy of praise or blame in so far as it is good or bad. For 
praise and blame is nothing other than for the goodness or badness of his action to be 
imputed to someone. Now an action is imputed to an agent when it is within his 
power, so that he has dominion over the act. But this is the case with all actions 
involving the will: for it is through the will that man has dominion over his 
action...Hence it follows that good or bad in actions of the will alone justifies praise 
and blame; for in such actions badness, fault and blame come to one and the same.  
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, 2 q21 a 2, resp. (Summa Theologiae, 
Turin: Marietti, 1950), volume 2,  p. 122 
 
Hume did not recognize the capacity for freedom as of moral significance - which 
is why he took moral blame to be no different from other forms of negative 
evaluation. But there is another difference between Aquinas and Hume. For 
Aquinas, the negative evaluation involved in moral blame is also a form of rational 
criticism, and addresses a failure to follow a form of rational direction. This 
direction comes not as rational advice, but as rational demand. This is a distinctive 
form of direction that is identified by the special form of negative appraisal, moral 
blame, that is made of those who, without excuse, disregard the direction – who, 
without excuse, breach moral obligation. 
 
Obligation and advice as modes of rational direction are distinguished at the level 
of appraisal - the way in which failure to follow the rational direction is negatively 
appraised. In the case of duty or obligation, the negative appraisal does not allege 
folly or lack of sense. That is the criticism that meets disregard of advice. Rather 
the criticism takes the form of moral blame. Moral obligation is that standard to 
breach which without excuse is to be morally blameworthy, not in the sense that 
blame should be communicated to you as a form of pressure, but in the sense that 
in your case the content of moral blame is true. And the message of moral blame is 
that the agent is a wrongdoer, and that in the absence of excuse the agent was 
therefore bad to have done what they did.  
 
So the direction given by moral obligation is located by the scholastic tradition 
within a general framework of rational direction. But the peculiar kind of rational 
direction involved is then explained in terms of a theory of appraisal - appraisal 
that is not simply of the agent’s capacity to respond to reason, but of how the agent 
exercises freedom.  
 
The general theory of rational direction takes motivations, the agent's decisions 
and intentions, to be directed at objects of thought - objects that specify various 
voluntary actions between which the agent must decide, and which he will perform 
on the basis of deciding to perform them. Thus I might have to decide between 
keeping a sum of money or giving it to someone else. Each voluntary action may 
have various reason-giving features that rationally support its performance. Thus 
keeping the money allows me to spend it on myself. Giving it to another might 
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  justify with a given force Reason-giving features 
        (e.g. repays a debt) 
 
 
Besides these reason-giving features and the justification they provide, we need the 
idea of various kinds of directive force with which these features might support or 
justify both the voluntary actions that possess them and the motivations for 
performing these voluntary actions. The difference between advisability and 
obligatoriness is then explained as a difference in respect of justificatory force - a 
difference between recommendation and demand - that is unpacked, in turn, in 
terms of a theory of appraisal. To disregard the force of advice is to be criticized as 
foolish or less than sensible. To disregard the force of obligation is to act badly so 
that, where there is no excuse such as from ignorance or lack of control, it was bad 
of one so to act. 
 
In the practical sphere the pair 'sensible' and 'foolish' shares with 'good' and 'bad' a 
set of common properties. Each pair similarly applies both to voluntary actions and 
to prior motivations to act, and in a way that both conveys direction, and that 
serves to appraise people for their response to such direction. 
 
The terms 'sensible' or 'foolish' can be used of voluntary actions to pick them out as 
possessing features that support or oppose their performance and leave that 
performance advisable or inadvisable. But they also apply to the motivations to 
perform those voluntary actions; and then they track the application to those 
motivations of the justificatory force generated by their voluntary objects. If it is 
sensible to give the money, then to intend or to be motivated to give the money is 
sensible too. And correspondingly if it is foolish to hand the money over, then it is 
foolish to intend to hand the money over. Finally those terms ‘sensible’ and 
‘foolish’ serve to appraise agents for their responsiveness to the force of the 
justification provided, both for voluntary actions and the prior motivations to 
perform them. Agents who are sensible act and are motivated to act in ways that 
are sensible. 
 
But the same pattern applies to ‘morally good’ and ‘morally bad’. The terms can 
similarly be used to pick out voluntary actions as possessing features that support 
or oppose their performance. And just as with ‘sensible’ this support applies also 
to the motivations to perform those actions. Giving the money might be morally 
good because it helps another or fulfills a promise. And if it is good to give the 
money, it is correspondingly good to intend or be motivated to give the money; if 
morally bad or wrong to give the money, then it is equally bad or wrong to intend 
to give the money. And then ‘good’ and ‘bad’ also serve to appraise agents for 




or lack of it for various voluntary actions and the motivations to perform them. 
While, by parallel contrast to ‘sensible/foolish’ and ‘good/bad’, ‘advisable’ and 
‘obligatory’ apply not to agents themselves, but only to motivations and actions, to 
pick them out as justified with the relevant kind of force. 
 
So ‘morally good' and 'morally bad' are used in the same way as 'sensible' and 
'foolish' in relation to objects of thought, to communicate the support given by 
them to psychological attitudes. And they are also used in the same way in 
arguments to support the formation of motivations directed at those objects of 
thought. And both 'bad/wrong' and 'foolish' are used to convey strong direction in a 
way that we immediately treat and understand as equally argumentatively 
conclusive in each case. To point out that doing A would be foolish is plainly not a 
merely preliminary step in a rational argument against doing A that would need to 
be completed by somehow showing that (therefore) it would be wrong or bad of 
one to do A. But nor is pointing out that it would be bad or wrong of one to do A 
merely the first step in a rational argument against doing A that would need to be 
completed by somehow showing that (therefore) it would be foolish of one to do 
A. Once either the folly or the wrongness and badness of an action has been 
established, each is on its own enough to convey an argumentative and rational 
rejection of the action as an option. Advisability and obligatoriness is each a 
genuine force of reason, and neither needs to be buttressed by the other.  
 
There is in late scholasticism a systematic project of using this appraisal-based 
account of moral obligation and the rational direction it provides not only to 
identify obligation as constituting a natural form of law  - a set of directives that 
are demanding, and that address a special responsibility for how we act – but 
sharply to distinguish this from the structures of legislation and sanction so 
characteristic of positive law. In particular it became increasingly clear to many in 
this tradition that appeal to divine or other legislation had no place in the theory of 
law as such. Thus take John Punch, an early seventeenth century Scotist: 
  
Since even if God never gave any command about the matter, it would still be bad 
to kill a human being without reason, to show contempt for one’s superiors, or to 
expose oneself to clear danger of death, therefore even if natural law did not do so 
by way of any particular commandment given by God, natural law would still 
forbid such actions. … for by the natural law we understand that on account of 
which some action is good or bad independently of any positive law, and so insofar 
as there would still be very many good and bad actions even if there were no divine 
commands, there would still be a natural law even in the absence of such 
commands.  John Punch, commentary on Scotus on the decalogue, distinctio 
37 in Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, volume 7, ed. Luke Wadding (Lyons, 
1639), pp. 857-77. 
 
Those who did still wish to hold on to a tie of natural law to divine legislation had 
a fight on their hands. They could not win the victory cheaply, just by claiming 
that law could not exist without legislators, officials and their aims. For they knew 
what was at issue were the conditions for a distinctively demanding kind of 
normativity, linked to appraisal, that addressed a special responsibility we have 
for how we act. So they had to struggle to make their case for divine legislation 
within the framework of that model. Thus Suarez concedes part of Punch’s case – 




that for law proper you need a special sort of badness – that involved in disregard 
of divine commands, that he calls praevaricatio or transgression:   
 
I therefore reply that in a human action there is indeed some goodness or badness 
by virtue of the object positively aimed at, in as much as that object is compatible 
or incompatible with right reason, so that by right reason the action can be counted 
as bad, and a fault and blameworthy in that regard, apart from any relation to law 
proper. But beyond this a human action has a particular character of being good 
or bad in relation to God, when we add divine law forbidding or decreeing, and in 
respect of that the human action counts in a particular way as a fault or 
blameworthy in relation to God by virtue of its breaching of the genuine law of 
God himself, which particular badness Paul seems to have referred to by the 
name of transgression when he said, 'Where there is not law, neither is there any 
transgression'. Francisco Suarez, De legibus ac legislatore deo, in Opera 
Omnia, volume 5, ed. Charles Berton (Paris: Louis Vives 1856) p. 110 (my 
emphases) 
 
Whether or not Suarez's position is convincing, it is clear that directiveness that is 
properly law-involving is being characterized by him in terms of a 'particular 
badness'. The peculiarly demanding direction that constitutes moral obligation as 
moral law is being characterised in terms of a distinctive form of moral appraisal. 
 
I have noted that the natural law tradition gives ethical significance to capacities 
distinct from the simple capacity to respond to reason, and that one such capacity 
is a capacity or power of self-determination. But the capacity for self-
determination is not the only such capacity at issue. For Hume’s interest in 
personal admirability or merit had an important antecedent. In the natural law 
tradition also, the theory of evaluation central to understanding moral obligation 
was part of a wider theory of personal admirability that included talent as well as 
virtue.  
 
And such a theory seems to be required to the extent that there do turn out to be 
parallels between our use of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in the evaluation of people both 
morally and also in relation to arts and skills. A theory of all this will be a general 
theory of (broadly) ethical good and bad. A full account of normativity in this area 
will develop Hume’s fascinating and often disregarded project of examining the 
affinities, as well as the differences, between virtue and talent – between personal 
admirability in its moral and its non-moral forms, including forms not interestingly 
a function of the agent’s reasonableness.11  
 
 
5. Thomas Hobbes and law as directive of the voluntary 
 
Law, for the natural law tradition, is not taken to be exclusively directive of the 
voluntary. The primary form of law is a kind of justificatory force – a force that is 
understood immediately to direct, like other forms of directive force within 
practical reason, non-voluntary motivation and not voluntary action alone. The 
force of demand moves us by leaving it correspondingly obligatory to decide on 
 
11 For such an account, as part of a wider account of normativity in general, see my The 




those voluntary actions that are obligatory, just as the force of advice moves us by 
making it correspondingly advisable to decide on those voluntary actions that are 
advisable.12 The force of moral obligation is tied to directing action – but as a 
locus of self-determination, not of voluntariness. 
 
But did not even the natural lawyers still see one, albeit for them secondary, form 
of obligation as tied to direction of the voluntary? This is obligation under positive 
law or legal obligation. For the following is a very inviting natural law model of 
the relation between moral obligatoriness and legal obligatoriness. Legal 
authorities serve to extend and render more determinate the requirements of the 
natural law, and especially the moral obligation or demand that we cooperate 
together for the good of a community. So legal authorities facilitate this by 
imposing legally obligatory directives to act together in specific ways, and these 
directives, when authority is doing its job, give us reason to act in those specific 
ways, and do so with the force of moral obligation. So legal obligatoriness will 
generally turn up where the reason-giving features we have so far been considering 
turn up – as a feature of actions that we might generally perform or refrain from 
voluntarily, on the basis of a decision so to do, and as a means to complying with 
legal obligations. Legal obligatoriness, then, is properly a reason-giving feature of 
the voluntary. And its function is to generate moral obligatoriness as a justificatory 
force – a force that applies both to the voluntary actions with that feature, and to 
the non-voluntary motivations so to act.  
 
Now this view does very plausibly cover many cases of legal obligation. Many 
legal obligations do fulfil just this action-coordinative function, facilitating morally 
demanded cooperation at the point of the voluntary. They direct us to some 
specific mode of cooperation, thereby obligating us morally to act together in that 
specific way - just because we have been so directed. But many early modern 
natural lawyers did not see positive legal directives as functioning solely to direct 
the voluntary. And this involved a feature of the natural law tradition to which 
Thomas Hobbes was deeply, and very influentially opposed. This was the 
tradition’s conception of political authority and the state - as not just a coordinator 
of human action, but a coercive teacher too. It was Hobbes’s opposition to this idea 
of the state as coercive teacher that led him very aggressively to tie positive law to 
the direction of the voluntary.    
 
Central to Hobbes’s attack on the natural law tradition is an attack on the human 
capacity that lay at its heart – the capacity for self-determination. Hobbes was not 
even a compatibilist about this capacity. He thought that the very idea of people 
determining for themselves what they do was incoherent. He had a range of very 
interesting objections to the idea, but one especially vivid and (on the surface) 
simple one was that the very idea of self-determination was viciously regressive: 
 
12 Thus Suarez on how moral obligations lie on the will, and not just on voluntary action:  
So teaches Saint Thomas and on this point everyone. And the point is established 
because the law of nature is placed in reason, and immediately directs and governs the 
will. So it is on the will first and foremost that as it were by its very nature the obligation 
of the law is imposed. So the law is not kept unless through the exercise of the will. De 






And if a man determine himself, the question will still remain what determined him 
to determine himself in that manner. Thomas Hobbes, The Questions 
Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, (London 1656) p. 26. 
 
Our actions were determined not by ourselves but by prior passions as motions in 
matter which were not themselves our doing. Action was restricted to 
voluntariness, but voluntariness conceived (as it had to be if Hobbes’s 
identification of action with voluntariness were not itself to prove viciously 
regressive) as an effect of motivation in passive form – of motivation as passion, 
not some inner action of decision. 
 
Law could no longer exist primarily as a distinctive form of normativity directive 
of a capacity for self-determination. How then would it exist? Clearly, if law is to 
remain directive exclusively of our capacity for action, and action is to be 
identified exclusively with voluntariness, then we immediately move into a theory 
of law as serving to direct the voluntary. If it is to be agency-specific, 
obligatoriness can no longer be a justificatory force generated by features of the 
voluntary – a justificatory force that like any such would apply to non-voluntary 
motivation. For non-voluntary motivation, on Hobbes’s view, is now uniformly 
passive. Obligatoriness must instead be restricted to occurring as a reason-giving 
feature of the voluntary – like many cases at least of legal obligatoriness under 
positive law.   
 
But Hobbes did not immediately move in this direction. For Hobbes did retain 
something like a conception of law as a justificatory force that addresses and binds 
non-voluntary motivation and not just voluntary action. He just gave up the tie to 
the direction of action. Where the fundamental form of law is concerned, that 
Hobbes terms the laws of nature, and which precedes the legislation of any earthly 
sovereign, law continues to exist just as a general form of rational direction at the 
level of the practical, applying like any such to non-voluntary motivations of the 
will, though now conceived simply as passive desire. 
 
The Laws of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they 
should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to putting them in act, not alwayes. 
Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 15 ‘Of other Lawes of Nature’, volume 2, ed. 
Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2012) p. 240. 
 
So desire can be bound by the laws of nature. Though, Hobbes observes, these 
laws of nature count as law, properly speaking, rather than general theorems of 
reason, only as commanded by a law-giver who exists prior to any earthly 
sovereign - God.13 Indeed it is easy to see why Hobbes so readily brings God into 
the picture at this point. Without God there would indeed be nothing much to 
distinguish these ‘laws’ of nature from general theorems of reason or advice, albeit 
very serious and forceful advice about the preservation of one’s life – advice that 
only a fool would disregard.   
 
13 See Hobbes, Leviathan chapter 15 ‘Of other Lawes of Nature’, volume 2, ed. Noel 






When we consider the legislation of human authorities, however, Hobbes takes 
quite a different attitude, and one which he repeatedly deploys in relation to one 
object of legal direction in particular – the direction of belief. And here it does 
become important to Hobbes that belief is not only inner, but also non-voluntary – 
and so for that reason something that cannot be subject to human legal direction: 
 
As for the inward thought, and beleef of men, which humane Governours can take 
no notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they are not voluntary, nor the 
effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of God; and 
consequently fall not under obligation. Hobbes, Leviathan chapter 40 ‘Of the 
Rights of the Kingdome of God’, volume 3, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 2012), p. 738. 
 
Hobbes was attacking a widely held view within the natural law tradition – that 
one proper object of human legal direction was belief. How could belief be a 
matter of legal direction?  
 
We find an especially worked out theory of belief and its legal direction in one of 
Hobbes’s key ideological opponents – Francisco Suarez. Suarez insists that 
considered just as an inner mental state belief is indeed not the concern of human 
law.14 Beliefs that are never expressed, which remain entirely shut up in the mind 
of the believer, are not the business of any human court. But beliefs, especially 
about religion and the ethical, are very apt to be expressed; and as expressed, and 
as concerned with God or the nature of other humans, they could, in his view, 
greatly affect the good of a human community. Here it would not be the mere 
occurrence of some speech that mattered; but the belief that the speech revealed. 
Moreover, motivations for voluntary action were not the only case where our 
capacity for self-determination might apply to an attitude that was non-voluntary. 
Just we can determine for ourselves what decisions to act we take so, under certain 
conditions, we can determine for ourselves what beliefs we hold. In those cases we 
can be just as distinctively and morally responsible for what we believe as for what 
voluntary actions we decide to perform.  
 
The ethical importance of recognizing and believing certain truths, and our 
capacity, in principle, to determine for ourselves whether we do so, could leave it 
morally obligatory on us to hold the relevant beliefs. And because our holding 
these beliefs could matter to the good of the community, our moral responsibility 
for such beliefs could fairly be enforced, through human legal directives backed by 
punishments - punishments that, because of our moral responsibility, could be 
deserved. Positive law could be directive of belief.15 This theory was not restricted 
to a model of the Church as a coercive authority, though it was certainly applied in 
that case, to explain the canon law on heresy; but, in general outline, was applied 
to the authority of the state as well, and in relation to more general forms of belief 
relevant to the good of a political community.  
 
14 On this point see Suarez De fide, in Opera Omnia, volume 12, p. 535 
 






But this theory was also accompanied by a very clear theory of a personal right to 
liberty, based on the same capacity for self-determination that, in the view of the 
natural lawyers, also enabled us to be bound by obligatory law. The normativity of 
law addressed our capacity to determine for ourselves what we do not only by 
imposing obligations on us, but also by giving us a right to liberty understood as a 
right to determine things for ourselves – a right to exercise our capacity for self-
determination. 16  This set normative limits to the coercive activities of human 
authorities. We had a right not to be subjected to coercive legal direction save by 
authorities whose jurisdiction extended to the relevant kind of activity, and under 
whose jurisdiction we ourselves fell. Authorities were under obligation not to 
attempt legal direction beyond those limits. So though the coercive direction of 
belief was allowed for as a just and intelligible use of human law, there were strict 
limits too. For example, in Suarez’s opinion states could not on their own authority 
impose obligations on religious belief, at least where supernatural or revealed 
religion was concerned, since their jurisdiction was not concerned with the human 
good at that level, revealed religious truth going beyond the natural happiness and 
justice that was the proper concern of the state.17  
 
Hobbes was in a more difficult position. For his denial of any human capacity for 
self-determination left him without that basis for a right to liberty. And he did not 
satisfactorily replace it with another, certainly not enough to generate a right to 
liberty that would obligate the state to its subjects. For Hobbes liberty is what is 
left us by the obligations of law in its various forms - by the laws of nature and 
then by the decrees of earthly sovereigns. The right to liberty survives, but as the 
space left obligation-imposing law. Supposing then, to take a case that would have 
immediately interested Hobbes’s seventeenth century readers, that the ruler of a 
state were to entertain directing his subjects to believe some debatable form of 
religion: what could block these subjects from being bound by such a directive? 
Not, in Hobbes’s system, any obligation on the ruler to respect their liberty. Nor 
was Hobbes willing to make an issue of the actual truth of the religion in question. 
 
Hobbes turns elsewhere – to a theory of the directiveness of law, at least in its 
coercive and humanly imposed form. Law cannot impose obligations on belief 
because belief cannot be produced through legal direction. He appeals to the only 
way, in his view, that law, backed by the threat of coercive sanctions, can actually 
get people to comply. And so we have a repeated appeal by him to two features of 
religious belief that supposedly make it impossible legally to coerce. First Hobbes 
appeals to the supposed privacy of belief. The thought is simple. When faced by 
the sovereign and his inquisitors, we can always conceal what we truly believe, so 
that any law on belief is unenforceable on that account. Then, secondly, belief is 
non-voluntary. Beliefs cannot be adopted or abandoned at will, just in order to 
 
16 Suarez De legibus ac deo legislatore in Opera Omnia, volume 5, p. 141. For further 
discussion of this linking of the right to liberty to the capacity for self-determination, and the 
implications for the right to liberty of Hobbes’s denial of the very possibility of self-
determination, see my ‘Thomas Hobbes and the ethics of freedom’ in Inquiry, 54 (2011) 541-
63; and my ‘Hobbes on liberty, action and free will’ in The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes eds. 
Kinch Hoekstra and Al Martinich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
 




comply with the law and avoid sanctions imposed on illegal belief. But that is the 
only way coercive law can work – as something that we can respond to voluntarily, 
on the basis of a decision to do so, just as a means to conforming to the law. And 
so we return to the view of legal obligation with which we began – the view, which 
Hume espoused after Hobbes, of legal obligations as directives on the voluntary. 
 
Hobbes won a victory here, at least for many in the English-language ethical 
tradition, where it is often taken as just obvious that belief cannot be subject to 
legal direction or legally coerced, because belief is not voluntary or subject to the 
will. As Bernard Williams noted, there is a ‘very important argument in favour of 
religious toleration’ namely that the coercion of belief is ‘essentially fruitless, 
because the forces of the state cannot reach a person’s centre of conviction’.18 
 
But the Hobbesean view does not adequately address the theory of the legal 
regulation of belief we find in Suarez. In the first place, for Suarez religious and 
ethical belief generally is not interestingly private. Such belief is to a great degree, 
and inevitably, a public phenomenon; it is of great significance in our social 
relations, and is very liable sooner or later to be expressed. That is one reason why 
what people believe can be of concern to a wider community. And on this issue 
Suarez is obviously correct. Hobbes imagines a religion happily surviving 
prolonged state hostility as a purely mental phenomenon, wholly locked up inside 
the head of each individual believer, and never, in any way, expressed. This 
fantasy is no more than studied naïveté on Hobbes’s part. 
 
But more crucially, the non-voluntariness of belief is just not to the point. For the 
function of sanction-backed legal coercion is not to motivate people to form or 
hold beliefs voluntarily, simply on the basis of a will or motivation to avoid 
sanctions. Rather the function of the legal direction and the threatened sanctions 
that come with it is to direct the believer's attention to a (supposedly) sound 
epistemic case, based on evidence or else on authoritative testimony, for the 
obligatory opinion - a case that the believer had hitherto been culpably ignoring - 
so that the required belief is then formed in response to that epistemic case. 
Consider Suarez’s model of the use of state law to enforce something that, being of 
his time, he thought quite obviously vital to the good of a political community – 
not some form of revealed religion, but natural religion, or a shared rational 
monotheism : 
 
Even a pagan—that is, a non-Christian—king, if he has a knowledge of the true God, 
may coerce his own subjects into believing that truth, either by their own reasoning if 
they are educated, or by putting human faith in more learned men, if they are 
ignorant; and consequently, he may compel those same subjects to cease from the 
worship of idols and from similar superstitions contrary to natural reason.  Suarez De 
fide in Opera Omnia, volume 12, p.451 (my emphases) 
 
The punitive imposition of sanctions does not presuppose that belief can be formed 
at will, irrespective of testimony or evidence. Belief is importantly non-voluntary 
because it is directed at its object as true, and so is dependent on truth-related 
 
18 See Bernard Williams ‘Toleration, a political or moral question’ in his collection  In the 





testimony or evidence. What is presupposed, instead, in Suarez’s view, is some 
capacity to determine for oneself whether one responds to that evidence. It is that 
power of self-determination that enables the believer fairly to be bound by 
obligations, positive as well as moral, on belief, and to be liable to just punishment 
for breach of those obligations. 
 
Behind this conception of state or positive law was a view of the educative 
function of law that was very old. We find it, for example, in book 10 of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The state’s legislation, including its imposition of 
punitively enforced legal obligations, is certainly concerned with something that 
looms large in modern legal theory – mutually advantageous coordination at the 
point of the voluntary. The tradition had no interest in denying this. But state 
legislation is also concerned with education – with inducing change in the 
direction of ethically important truth at the level of citizens’ belief.  The state is a 
coercive teacher. 
 
The function of sanction-backed legal obligations, on this natural law tradition, is 
not restricted to giving justifications, perhaps with the force of moral obligation, 
for doing something at the point of the voluntary. Sometimes legal obligations 
serve to direct attention to prior justifications for the non-voluntary - such as those 
arising for belief out of the truth of a socially and morally important claim, 
whether about God or about the nature and status of other humans; and in a case 
where these justifications, though dependent on truth, as relating to that truth also 
involve some good that binds us with the force of moral obligation, such as that we 
all believe this important truth on this ethically vital matter.   
 
Despite modern protests that the coercion of belief is ‘essentially fruitless’ the 
coercive structures of early modern states could be rather effective at changing 
what large numbers of people believed. Indeed, modern states do still appear to go 
to some length to influence belief, not just by various forms of positive recognition 
and endorsement, but also by the threat and application of sanctions – though in 
our culture the desired beliefs are generally produced through sanction-backed 
directives on other things. The legal prohibitions and the sanctions typically now 
lie not on beliefs themselves, but on their subject matter – on actions that the state 
very much wishes us to come to believe are wrong. Nevertheless, this difference 
aside, it does seem that penal coercion and its threat in the criminal law are still 
aimed at influencing belief, in just the way that so interested Joel Feinberg: which 
is to engage attention and help communicate a message that, in many cases, there 
may anyway be prior grounds to believe - that the action threatened by punishment 
really would be seriously wrong.19 One function of sanction-backed criminal law 
may indeed be to drive home an argument and change what people actually 
believe. The state may indeed be a coercive teacher. It is not surprising then that a 
tradition of ethical thought that took deeply seriously coercive authority’s role as a 
teacher, and that saw law and obligation as centred on the direction, and the 
appraisal, of self-determination with respect to non-voluntary attitudes, should 
 
19  See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 





have viewed the non-voluntariness of belief as no practical obstacle at all to its 
legal direction.  
 
 
Thomas Pink 
 
